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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
On a spring day in 2007, Terry Hoskins was fixing his truck, which was parked on 
his property, when a couple of police officers came to arrest him on two misdemeanor 
warrants. The officers had Mr. Hoskins exit his truck and they handcuffed him. As one 
of the officers handcuffed Mr. Hoskins and walked him around to the front of his house, 
where a patrol car was waiting, the other officer began searching Mr. Hoskins' truck. 
That officer found a spoon containing methamphetamine residue under one of the 
passenger seats of Mr. Hoskins' truck. Mr. Hoskins was charged with possession of a 
controlled substance; he pled guilty; and he received a seven-year prison sentence. 
Mr. Hoskins did not file a direct appeal. 
In late 2008, Mr. Hoskins filed a petition for post-conviction relief. His primary 
contention was that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel from his defense 
attorney insofar as his attorney failed to seek suppression of the spoon and the 
methamphetamine. In response, the State moved for summary dismissal, arguing that, 
because any suppression motion that could have been filed would have been denied 
(because, according to the State, the officer's search of Mr. Hoskins' truck was a valid 
search incident to arrest pursuant to New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) and its 
Idaho progeny), Mr. Hoskins' counsel cannot be said to have rendered deficient 
performance in failing to file a suppression motion and, besides, Mr. Hoskins could not 
have been prejudiced by his counsel's failure to file a suppression motion. The district 
court agreed with the State's argument and summarily dismissed Mr. Hoskins' petition. 
Mr. Hoskins timely appealed the district court's summary dismissal order. On 
appeal, Mr. Hoskins contends that he raised one or more genuine issues of material fact 
concerning both his counsel's deficient performance in failing to file a suppression 
motion, and the prejudice he has suffered thereby, because, under Arizona v. Ganf, 
- U.S. -, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009), had a suppression motion been filed, it would have 
been, or at least should have been, granted. Accordingly, he asserts that the district 
court erred in summarily dismissing his petition. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinns 
In 2007, Terry Hoskins pled guilty to a single count of possession of a controlled 
substance (methamphetamine). (R., p.3.) He received a unified sentence of seven 
years, with three years fixed. (R., p.3.) He did not appeal his conviction or sentence. 
(R., p.3.) 
On October 20, 2008, Mr. Hoskins timely filed a verified petition for post- 
conviction relief relating to his criminal conviction. (R., pp.3-9.) That petition presented 
only one claim that is relevant to the present appeal-Mr. Hoskins' claim that he 
received ineffective assistance of counsel when his defense attorney failed to file a 
motion to suppress the methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia (a spoon) underlying 
his conviction. (R., pp.3-9.) Between the verified petition, and two subsequently-filed 
affidavits, Mr. Hoskins set forth the following facts in support of that claim: 
On March 6, 2007, Mr. Hoskins was fixing a broken turn signal on his truck 
(which was parked in his yard) when the police contacted him. (R., pp.4, 28, 
29.) 
6 The officers called out Mr. Hoskins' name, then ordered him out of his truck. 
(R., p.28.) 
As the officers approached Mr. Hoskins, they indicated that they had two 
misdemeanor warrants for his arrest. (R., pp.4, 34.) 
Mr. Hoskins was handcuffed, taken around to the front of his house, and 
placed in a patrol car. (R., pp.4,28-29.) 
As Mr. Hoskins was being handcuffed and walked around to the front of his 
house by one of the officers, the other officer began searching the passenger 
compartment of his truck. (R., pp.4, 28-29.) 
A few minutes after Mr. Hoskins was placed in the police car, one of the 
officers confronted him with a spoon containing a crystal substance which the 
officer told him had been found under the passenger seat of his truck. (R., 
pp.29, 35.) According to the officers, that substance tested positive for 
methamphetamine. (R., pp.29, 35.) 
Had a suppression motion been filed, and granted, Mr. Hoskins would not 
have pled guilty. (R., p.35.) 
On January 26, 2009, the State filed a motion seeking summary dismissal of 
Mr. Hoskin's petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.31-32.) In its motion, the State 
argued that it was entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law because there was 
no meritorious basis for Mr. Hoskins' counsel to have filed a suppression motion and, 
therefore, there was no basis to conclude that Mr. Hoskins' counsel had rendered 
deficient performance, or that Mr. Hoskins had suffered prejudice in any way. (R., 
pp.3f-32.) Specifically, the State argued that under New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 
(1981), the search of Mr. Hoskins' truck was a constitutionally-permissible search 
incident to arrest. (R., p.32.) 
On March 2, 2009, the district court held a hearing on the State's motion for 
summary dismissal. (See generally R., p.37; Tr.) At that hearing, the prosecutor made 
the same argument that he had made in his motion for summary dismissal-that under 
Belfon, and the Idaho cases interpreting Belfon, "an officer may contemporaneously, 
incident to the lawful custodial arrest of an occupant of an automobile, search the 
passenger compartment of that automobile even if the occupant has been removed 
from the vehicle and handcuffed," and, since the search was constitutionally- 
permissible, any suppression motion would have failed and Mr. Hoskins' petition, 
therefore, failed to state a claim. (Tr., p.1, L.18 - p.3, L.18, p.6, L.18 - p.7, L.23.) 
Ultimately, the district court adopted the reasoning of the State and ruled that any 
suppression motion filed by Mr. Hoskins' defense attorney would have failed and, 
therefore, Mr. Hoskins' counsel could not have been ineffective for failing to file such a 
motion. (Tr., p.11, L.12 - p.13, L.15.) Specifically, with regard to the merits of any 
potential suppression motion, the district court ruled as follows: 
A search incident to arrest permits the police to search an arrestee 
following a lawful custodial arrest and is premised on the justifications of 
necessity to protect the officer in the vicinity from dangerous objects or 
weapons and present [sic] the concealment, destruction of evidence within 
the reach of the arrestee. 
As indicated by [the prosecutor] in citing Belton, Nickel [State v. 
Nickel, 134 ldaho 610, 7 P.3d 219 (2000)], Charpentier [State v. 
Charpentier, 131 ldaho 649, 962 P.2d 1033 (1998)], and-is it Mclntee 
[State V. Mclntee, 124 ldaho 803, 864 P.2d 641 (Ct. App. 1993)]? . . . 
. . . Those cases outline the current status of ldaho law regarding 
the search incident to arrest. 
The officers in this case, based on the evidence before this Court, 
had probable cause. As indicated by Mr. Hoskins in his affidavit, they had 
two misdemeanor warrants, which allowed them to arrest him. He was in 
his vehicle at the time; and he was at the scene at least, if not right at the 
vehicle, when the search began. 
And even if he had been removed, based on the current status of 
ldaho law, that search could have taken place and was, therefore, a 
proper warrantless search of that vehicle pursuant to ldaho law. 
In reviewing that, this Court does find that the evidence would not 
have been suppressed and would have been admissible at trial in this 
matter. 
. . . Vjhis Court would not have suppressed that evidence and 
does not see any basis of why any other Court would suppress that 
evidence. . . . 
(Tr., p.1 I ,  L.12 - p.12, L.20 (emphasis added).) A few days later, on March 5, 2009, the 
district court entered its written Order of Dismissal. (R., pp.39-40.) In relevant part, that 
order states as follows: 
Based on the facts and the law, the Court finds that the search which is 
the focus of this action was lawful. A motion to suppress would have been 
denied if it had been filed by Petitioner's trial counsel. As such, the failure 
of Petitioner's trial counsel to file the suppression motion cannot be 
considered to have fallen below an objective standard of reasonableness, 
i.e., counsel's performance was not defective. In addition, it cannot be 
said that the outcome of Petitioner's case would have been different if 
Petitioner's trial counsel had filed a motion to suppress. 
(R., pp.39-40.) 
On March 19, 2009, Mr. Hoskins filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.42-44.) 
On appeal, Mr. Hoskins contends that he raised one or more genuine issues of material 
fact concerning both his counsel's deficient performance in failing to file a suppression 
motion, and the prejudice he has suffered thereby, because, under Arizona v. Gant, 
- U.S. -, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009), had a suppression motion been filed, it would have 
been, or at least should have been, granted. Accordingly, he asserts that the district 
court erred in summarily dismissing his petition. 
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Hoskins' petition for post-conviction 
relief? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred In Summarilv Dismissing Mr. Hoskins' Petition For Post- 
Conviction Relief 
A. Introduction 
As noted, Mr. Hoskins' petition for post-conviction relief alleged that his defense 
attorney had rendered ineffective assistance (in contravention of Mr. Hoskins' Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel) for failing to file a suppression motion on Mr. Hoskins' 
behalf. In response to a motion from the State, however, the district court summarily 
dismissed Mr. Hoskins' claim. That dismissal was based solely on the conclusion that a 
suppression motion, had it been filed by defense counsel, would have been denied 
under New York v, Belfon, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), Sfate v. Nickel, 134 ldaho 610, 7 P.3d 
219 (2000), Sfafe v. Charpentier, 131 ldaho 649, 962 P.2d 1033 (1998), and State v. 
Mclnfee, 124 ldaho 803, 864 P.2d 641 (Ct. App. 1993). The district court reasoned that 
if the suppression motion was doomed to fail, Mr. Hoskins' defense counsel could not 
have rendered deficient performance in failing to file it; nor could Mr. Hoskins have been 
prejudiced by his counsel's failure to file that motion. 
The district court's ruling, however, was incorrect. The facts alleged in 
Mr. Hoskins' petition, assuming they are true (as we must at this stage of the 
proceeding) show a clear violation of Mr. Hoskins' Fourth Amendment right to be free 
from unreasonable searches. Accordingly, had a suppression motion been filed, it likely 
would have been (or at least should have been) granted. Furthermore, competent 
counsel should have known that a suppression motion likely would have been granted 
and, therefore, would have filed one. Thus, Mr. Hoskins' petition, and its supporting 
affidavits, raised one or more genuine issues of material fact entitling Mr. Hoskins to an 
evidentiary hearing. 
B. Applicable Legal Standards 
The United States Constitution "guarantees a [criminal defendant a] fair trial 
through the Due Process Clauses, but it defines the basic elements of a fair trial largely 
through the several provisions of the Sixth Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984). One such provision is the right to the assistance of counsel, 
U.S. CONST. amend VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to 
. . . have the assistance of counsel for his defense."), which has been interpreted as the 
right to the effective assistance of counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685-86. 
There is a two-pronged test for determining whether an attorney has rendered 
ineffective assistance in contravention of a defendant's right to counsel. The threshold 
inquiry is whether counsel's performance was "deficient," ie., whether it "fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness," as judged "under prevailing professional norms." 
Id. at 687-91. Assuming there has been deficient performance, the next inquiry is 
whether that deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Id. at 687, 691-96. In 
order to establish "prejudice," it need not be shown "that counsel's deficient conduct 
more likely than not altered the outcome in the case" since the "result of a proceeding 
can be rendered unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors of 
counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have determined the 
outcome." Id. at 693-94. Instead, it need only be shown "that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different." Id. at 694. 
In Idaho, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are most appropriately 
asserted through petitions for post-conviction relief. Sparks v. State, 140 ldaho 292, 
295-96, 92 P.3d 542, 545-46 (Ct. App. 2004). A petition for post-conviction relief 
initiates a proceeding that is separate and distinct from the underlying criminal action 
which led to the petitioner's conviction. Peltier v. Stafe, 119 ldaho 454, 456, 808 P.2d 
373, 375 (1991). It is a civil proceeding governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act (hereinafter, UPCPA) (I.C. $5 19-4901 to -491 1) and the ldaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Peltier, 119 ldaho at 456, 808 P.2d at 375. 
Because a post-conviction action is a civil proceeding, the petitioner must prove 
his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. Martinez v. State, 126 ldaho 8$3, 
816, 892 P.2d 488, 491 (Ct. App. 1995). However, the petition initiating post-conviction 
proceeding differs from the complaint initiating a civil action. A post-conviction petition 
is required to include more than "a short and plain statement of the claim"; it "must be 
verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and 
affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, or the 
application must state why such supporting evidence is not attached." Id.; I.C. 5 19- 
4903. "In other words, the application must present or be accompanied by admissible 
evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal." 
Small v. State, 132 ldaho 327, 331, 971 P.2d 11 51, 11 55 (Ct. App. 1998). 
Just as ldaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides for summary judgment in other 
civil proceedings, the UPCPA allows for summary disposition (including summary 
dismissal) of petitions where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and one 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.C. 3 19-4906(c). In analyzing a post- 
conviction petition to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate, the district 
court need not "accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported 
by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law." Martinez, 126 ldaho at 
816-17, 892 P.2d at 491-92. However, if the petitioner presents evidentiary support for 
his allegations, the district court must take the petitioner's allegations as true, at least 
until such time as they are controverted by the State. Tramel v. State, 92 ldaho 643, 
646, 448 P.2d 649, 652 (1968). This is so even if the allegations appear incredible on 
their face. Id. Thus, only after the State controverts the petitioner's allegations can the 
district court consider the evidence. Drapeau v. State, 103 ldaho 612, 651 P.2d 546 
(Ct. App. 1982). But in doing so, it must still liberally construe the facts and draw 
reasonable inferences in favor of the petitioner, Small, 132 ldaho at 331, 971 P.2d at 
1155.' If a question of material fact is presented, the district court must conduct an 
evidentiary hearing to resolve that question. Small, 132 ldaho at 331, 971 P.2d at 1155. 
If there is no question of fact, and if the State is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, 
dismissal can be ordered sua sponte, or pursuant to the State's motion. I.C. § 19- 
4906(b), (c). 
Because evaluation of a motion for summary disposition will never involve the 
finding of contested facts by the district court, it necessarily involves only determinations 
of law. Accordingly, an appellate court will review a district court's summary dismissal 
order de novo. Muchow v. State, 142 ldaho 401,402-03, 128 P.3d 938, 939-40 (2006). 
' The district court need not accept those of the petitioner's allegations which are 
"clearly disproved by the record." Coonfz v. State, 129 ldaho 360, 368, 924 P.2d 622, 
630 (Ct. App. 1996). 
C. Mr. Hoskins' Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claim Is Properlv Before This 
Before addressing Mr. Hoskins' substantive argument on appeal, mention should 
be made of the argument-or lack thereof-presented by Mr. Hoskin's post-conviction 
counsel at the hearing on the State's summary dismissal motion.' After the prosecutor 
argued in favor of summary dismissal (presenting the same argument he had made in 
his motion-that, under Belfon and its ldaho progeny, any suppression motion that 
Mr. Hoskins' defense counsel could have filed on Mr. Hoskins' behalf would have been 
meritless), Mr. Hoskins' post-conviction counsel failed to come up with a counter- 
argument. Instead, Mr. Hoskins' post-conviction counsel stated as follows: 
The, the thrust of [Mr. Hoskins'] argument is, is what, what [the 
prosecutor] has stated, that his attorney was ineffective for failing to file a 
motion to suppress; and he believes that, that there was a suppressible 
motion or that, that the evidence would have been suppressed had, had 
that motion been made. 
Looking at the affidavit, [Mr. Hoskins] states that the officer, when 
[Mr. Hoskins] was being cuffed, began searching the vehicle. As far as I 
can see, that's a search that was made incident to the arrest. 
Mr. Hoskins has brought up or raised a case with me. It's an 
Arizona case, State versus Gant. It's 216 Arizona 1, 2007 case. In that 
case the Arizona Court held that the defendant had been arrested and 
then removed from the scene and placed in the patrol vehicle, at which 
time the officers conducted a search. And the Arizona Supreme Court 
held there was no longer a reason for them to do the search incident to 
arrest, and they suppressed the evidence. 
. . . I agree that Idaho law would, would be different than that. The 
cases that I've researched in ldaho would be different than that. And even 
based on Mr. Hoskins' affidavit, he, he wasn't removed from the scene. 
He was there when the, when the search was being conducted, so. 
Mr. Hoskins was not present at that hearing. (See Tr., p. I ,  Ls.7-11.) 
11 
And that, that Arizona case also is up on appeal to the U.S. 
Supreme Court. It has been appealed, being considered. 
So I, I just can't see an argument that I can make on behalf of 
Mr. Hoskins that, that the search was not conducted correctly. I think it 
was done pursuant to a, an incident to the arrest, and I don't have an 
argument against that, so. 
(Tr., p.4, L.4-p.5, L.18.) 
Given the foregoing statements by Mr. Hoskins' post-conviction counsel, the 
State will most likely urge this Court to affirm the district court without even reaching the 
merits of Mr. Hoskins' ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Specifically, the State will 
likely seek affirmation of the district court's dismissal order on procedural grounds by 
attempting to characterize Mr. Hoskins' counsel's statements as either a waiver of 
Mr. Hoskins' claim or, perhaps, an invitation for the district court to err. However, 
Mr. Hoskins submits that, for the reasons set forth below, his counsels' comments 
affected neither a waiver, nor an invitation for the district court to err. 
1. Mr. Hoskins' Post-Conviction Counsel Did Not Waive His Client's 
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claim 
In Franck-Tee1 v. State, 143 ldaho 664, 152 P.3d 25 (Ct. App. 2006) (implicitly 
overruled, in part, by DeRushe v. State, 146 ldaho 599, 200 P.3d 1148 (2009)), the 
ldaho Court of Appeals discussed the ability of a post-conviction petitioner's counsel to 
waive the petitioner's claims at a summary dismissal hearing. In that case, the Court of 
Appeals held that a trial court may "rely on the representations of a party's attorney as 
to what issue or issues the client wants to pursue" and "[olnce the attorney represents 
that the client does not wish to proceed on particular grounds in open court, the court 
may treat those grounds as waived by the c~ient."~ Id. at 670, 152 P.3d 31. 
In this case, the State cannot satisfy the Franck-Tee/ waiver standard, as the 
statements by Mr. Hoskins' post-conviction counsel did not convey-explicitly or 
implicitly-any message that Mr. Hoskins no longer wished to pursue his claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel for his defense attorney's failure to file a suppression 
motion. To the contrary, post-conviction counsel's statements made it clear that 
Mr. Hoskins did, in fact, want to pursue that claim: 
The, the thrust of [Mr. Hoskins'] argument is, is what, what [the 
prosecutor] has stated, that his attorney was ineffective for failing to file a 
motion to suppress; and he believes that, that there was a suppressible 
motion or that, that the evidence would have been suppressed had, had 
that motion been made. 
Mr. Hoskins has brought up or raised a case with me. It's an 
Arizona case, State versus Gant. It's 216 Arizona 1, 2007 case. In that 
case the Arizona Court held that the defendant had been arrested and 
then removed from the scene and placed in the patrol vehicle, at which 
time the officers conducted a search. And the Arizona Supreme Court 
held there was no longer a reason for them to do the search incident to 
arrest, and they suppressed the evidence. 
The Franck-Tee1 Court noted, however, that if the petitioner did not authorize the 
waiver and, thus, did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive the claims at 
issue, he may have a viable basis to file a successive petition for post-conviction relief. 
Franck-Teel, 143 Idaho at 670,152 P.3d at 30. Thus, the Court of Appeals encouraged 
the district courts and attorneys to be cautious in finding waivers of post-conviction 
claims where the post-conviction petitioner is not present. It encouraged the district 
courts to "require the presence and participation" of the post-conviction petitioner at 
summary dismissal hearings, id. at 670 n.2, 152 P.3d at 30 n.2, and, in the absence of 
the petitioner, suggested that counsel should "take steps to ensure the record clearly 
shows that the client wished to waive certain grounds for relief. For example, the 
afforney should file an amended application, a letter, or an affidavit signed by the client 
that affirmatively waives the grounds upon which the client no longer wishes to 
proceed." Id.at670n.q, 152P.3dat30n.l. 
(Tr., p.4, L.4 - p.5, L.1.) Moreover, even if post-conviction counsel's comments could 
be construed as an expression of his client's desire not to proceed with the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, the reality is that the district court did proceed on that 
claim. (See Tr., p.8, L.1 - p.13, L.19.) Thus, Franck-Tee1 would then seem to be 
inapplicable. This is not a situation where the petitioner is trying to argue on appeal 
about an issue that neither the State, nor the district court, had an opportunity to 
address below. 
2. Mr. Hoskins' Post-Conviction Counsel Did Not Invite The District Court's 
Error 
Under ldaho law, it is clear that a party may not be heard to complain on appeal 
about an error occurring in the trial court which he induced or invited through his own 
actions. State V. Owsley, 105 ldaho 836, 837-38, 673 P.2d 436, 437-38 (1983). In this 
case, however, Mr. Hoskins' counsel did not induce or invite the district court's error. 
Although counsel, in response to a direct question from the district court, 
acknowledged that existing ldaho authority was squarely against his client's position (as 
he was ethically obligated to do under I.R.P.C. 3.3), and he explained that he had no 
argument to make in support of his client's position (as he could not ask the district 
court to overrule ldaho precedent since the district court had no authority to do so), he 
never actually conceded the ineffective assistance of counsel claim that is now on 
appeal. (See Tr., p.5, Ls.3-18.) Thus, it cannot be said that he induced or invited the 
district court to rule as it did. Indeed, even if counsel had conceded his client's claim, 
this Court would be hard-pressed to conclude that counsel "induced" the district court's 
error, as it was the State that had first argued that the search in question was a proper 
search incident to arrest under Belton and its Idaho progeny. (See R., pp.31-32 (State's 
motion for summary dismissal).) 
D. The District Court Erred In Summarilv Dismissina Mr. Hoskins' Ineffective 
Assistance Of Counsel Claim Because Mr. Hoskins Raised Genuine Issues Of 
Material Fact As To Whether His Counsel Was Deficient For Failing To File A 
Suppression Motion. And Whether That Deficient Performance Preiudiced 
Mr. Hoskins 
As noted above, in his petition for post-conviction relief, Mr. Hoskins alleged that 
his defense attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to move for 
suppression of certain evidence, i.e., the methamphetamine underlying his conviction 
for possession of a controlled substance. (See R., pp.3-9.) In support of his petition for 
post-conviction relief, he presented evidence (in the form of his own sworn statements) 
indicating that while working on a truck on his own property, he was approached by 
multiple police officers, ordered out of truck, handcuffed, and arrested on two 
misdemeanor warrants, and that while he was being led away in handcuffs by one 
officer, the other officer began searching the passenger compartment of his truck, 
eventually discovering a spoon with methamphetamine residue'under one of the seats. 
(R., pp.4, 28-29, 34-35.) 
The State moved for summary dismissal of Mr. Hoskins' claim based on its 
contention that, even if Mr. Hoskins' factual allegations were true, his defense attorney's 
failure to file a suppression motion could not have amounted to ineffective assistance of 
counsel because that motion would have been denied anyway (and, since it would have 
been denied anyway, Mr. Hoskins' defense attorney cannot be said to have rendered 
deficient performance in failing to file it and Mr. Hoskins could not have been prejudiced 
by counsel's failure to file it). (R., pp.31-32.) Specifically, the State argued that any 
suppression motion that Mr. Hoskins' defense attorney might have filed would have 
been denied because the officer's search of his truck was a valid search incident to 
arrest under the United States Supreme Court's decision in New York v. Belfon, supra, 
and its Idaho progeny, including Sfate v. Charpentier, supra. (R., pp.31-32; Tr., p.2, 
L . l l  - p.3, L.18, p.6, L.18 - p.7, L.23.) Ultimately, of course, the district court adopted 
the State's reasoning and dismissed Mr. Hoskins' petition. (R., pp.39-40; Tr., p.8, L. l  - 
p.13, L.9.) 
The district court was incorrect. For the reasons set forth below, it is clear that, 
had Mr. Hoskins' defense attorney filed a suppression motion, that motion would have 
(or at least should have) been granted. Accordingly, Mr. Hoskins' petition for post- 
conviction relief presents a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and 
ought not to have been summarily dismissed. 
1. Because The Search Of Mr. Hoskins' Truck Was Unreasonable Under 
The Fourth Amendment To The United States Constitution. Had His 
Defense Attornev Filed A Su~pression Motion. That Motion Would Have 
Been (Or At Least Should Have Been) Granted 
The Fourth Amendment provides that we have a right "against unreasonable 
searches and seizures" and, further, that "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Although 
Fourth Amendment is not explicit as to the interplay between its "reasonableness" 
requirement and its "warrant" requirement, the United States Supreme Court has held 
that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable and, therefore, unconstitutional, 
unless they are undertaken pursuant to "a few specifically established and well- 
delineated exceptions." Kafz v. United Sfafes, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
One "specifically established and well-delineated exception" to the warrant 
requirement is the exception for searches incident to lawful arrests. Arizona v. Gant, 
i 
- U.S. -, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009). That exception is based on the arresting 
officer's need to search the arrestee for weapons so as to ensure his own safety and 
avoid the arrestee's escape, as well as his need to search the arrestee for evidence that 
could othetwise be destroyed by the arrestee. See id. 
In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), the Supreme Court held that a 
search incident to arrest may include not only the person of the arrestee, but also the 
"area within his immediate control," i.e., "the area within which he might gain possession 
of a weapon or destructible evidence." Id. at 763. As the Supreme Court later 
observed, limiting the search incident to arrest to the person of the arrestee and the 
area within his immediate control "ensures that the scope of a search incident to arrest 
is commensurate with its purposes of protecting arresting officers and safeguarding any 
evidence of the offense of arrest that an arrestee might conceal or destroy. Gant, 129 
S. Ct. at 1716. 
Later, in New York v. Belfon, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), the Supreme Court applied 
Chimel to a situation where the interior of an automobile was part of the area within the 
immediate control of four unsecured arrestees. In that case. the Court held the 
arresting officer had not violated the arrestees' Fourth Amendment rights by searching 
the passenger compartment of the vehicle, or the containers found therein. Id. at 460- 
63. Unfortunately, the Belfon Court couched its holding in terms that were susceptible 
to an overly broad interpretation: "when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest 
of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, 
search the passenger compartment of that automobile." Id. at 460. 
In light of the foregoing language in Belton, some authorities, including the ldaho 
Supreme Court have come to believe that as long as the recent occupant of an 
automobile has been arrested, the police are free to search the passenger compartment 
of that car (and any containers found therein)-even if the arrestee has been secured in 
handcuffs, placed in the back of a police car, and, in some cases, even transported from 
the scene. See, e.g., State v. Nickel, 134 ldaho 61 0, 61 3-14, 7 P.3d 21 9, 222-23 (2000) 
(holding that a search of an arrestee's vehicle was a valid search incident to arrest 
pursuant to Belton and State v. Charpentier, infra, even though the arrestee had already 
been subdued by both officers, and was being led away in handcuffs by one officer 
while the other officer began searching the vehicle); State v. Charpentier, 131 ldaho 
649, 651-53, 962 P.2d 1033, 1035-37 (1998) (assuming that, under Belton, the "search 
incident to arrest" exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment 
permitted a warrantless search of an automobile even after the driver had been secured 
in handcuffs and placed in a police car, and then interpreting Article I, section 17 of the 
ldaho Constitution to be co-extensive with that interpretation of Belton); State v. 
Mclntee, 124 ldaho 803, 864 P.2d 641 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding that Belton allows for a 
search of a vehicle, incident to an arrest, even after the arrestee has been transported 
from the scene). As it turns out though, those authorities have misinterpreted Belton, 
reading it far too expansively. 
In Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004), the United States Supreme 
Court reviewed the very narrow question of whether Belton is limited to situations where 
the arresting officer initiates contact with the arrestee while the arrestee is in the vehicle, 
or whether it also applies where they exited the vehicle of his own accord prior to being 
contacted by the arresting ~ f f i ce r .~  See id. at 619, 622 & n.2, 623-34 & n.4. In that 
case, the Court specifically declined to address the question of whether Belton 
pronounced a rule that was so broad as to allow for a search of a vehicle incident to the 
arrest of a recent occupant even if the recent occupant no longer has access to the 
inside of the vehicle. id. at 622 & n.2, 624 n.4. Although that issue was not before the 
Court, three justices took the opportunity to explicitly disavow such a broad 
interpretation of Belton. Justice O'Connor wrote separately to express her 
"dissatisfaction" with the fact that "lower court decisions seem now to treat the ability to 
search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent occupant as a police entitlement 
rather than as an exception justified by the twin rationales of Chimel," and she attributed 
those lower court decisions to "Belton's shaky foundation." Id. at 624-25 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring in part). However, Justice O'Connor indicated that she was unwilling to 
attempt to correct the wayward lower courts because the issue of whether current 
interpretations of Belton had gone too far afield from the rationales of Chime1 was not 
properly before the Court. Id. at 624-25 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part). Justice 
Scalia, who was joined by Justice Ginsburg, also wrote separately. He expressed his 
concern that, regardless of what issue had been briefed by the parties, any attempt to 
A plurality of the Court (seven justices) determined that a search incident to arrest is 
not necessarily unconstitutional just because the arrestee exited the vehicle of his own 
accord prior to being contacted by the arresting officer. See Thomton, 541 U.S. at 620- 
32. Justices Stevens and Souter, however, dissented, arguing that, in interpreting 
Belton, a line ought to be drawn between those who had exited the vehicle of their own 
accord and, thus, become pedestrians, and those who had been ordered out of their 
vehicle by the arresting officer. See id. at 633-36 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
apply Belton to a situation where the arrestee is handcuffed and locked in the back of a 
police car stretches the ChimellBelton doctrine "beyond its breaking point." Id. at 625- 
29 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). He then went on to advocate abandonment 
of the officer safety rationale behind the "search incident to arrest" exception, endorse 
an exception based solely on the need to discover evidence of the crime for which the 
suspect is being arrested, and explain that he would approve of the search in Thornton 
based on this rationale. Id. at 629-32 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
After Thornton, therefore, it was exceedingly clear that the scope of the Belton 
rule (and, indeed, the continued viability of the rule generally) was still an open 
question, and that those authorities which had interpreted Belton broadly, reading it to 
allow searches of the passenger compartment of a vehicle, even after the recent 
occupant arrestee could no longer gain access to the interior of that vehicle, were in 
doubt. Indeed, after the U.S. Supreme Court's 2004 Thornton decision, a defendant in 
state court in Arizona, Rodney Gant, argued that Belton did not allow for the search 
(justified, in part, as a search incident to arrest) of the automobile in his case because, 
by the time the search occurred, he had been arrested pursuant to an outstanding 
warrant, handcuffed, and locked in the back of a police car. State v. Gant, 143 P.3d 
379, 380, 382 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006) (vacated by State v. Gant, 162 P.3d 640 (2007)).~ 
Mr. Gant's case actually began in 2000. After his motion to suppress the drugs found 
in a search of his car had been denied, Mr. Gant was convicted and sentenced. Gant, 
143 P.3d at 380. He then appealed for the first time, making the argument that was 
ultimately rejected in Thornton-that an automobile may not be searched incident to a 
recent occupant's arrest where the arrestee exited the vehicle of his own accord. See 
State v. Gant, 43 P.3d 188, 191-94 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002). He prevailed with that 
argument in the Arizona Court of Appeals. See id. Thereafter, the United States 
Supreme Court granted the State of Arizona's petition for a writ of certiorari Arizona v. 
Gant, 538 U.S. 976 (2003). However, a few months later, the Supreme Court: vacated 
The Arizona Court of Appeals agreed. Id. at 382-86. After granting review of Mr. Gant's 
case in 2007, the Arizona Supreme Court also agreed. Stafe v. Gant, 162 P.3d 640, 
642-46 (Ariz. 2007). Finally, the United States Supreme Court once again granted 
certiorari in Mr. Gant's case, Arizona v. Gant, 128 S. Ct. 1443 (2008), this time to 
answer the "chorus" of calls for the Court to revisit Belton, Arizona v. Gant, - U.S. -, 
129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009) (hereinafier, Gant). 
In Gant, the Supreme Court reiterated and reaffirmed its holding in Chimel- 
searches "incident to arrest may only include 'the arrestee's person and the area "within 
his immediate control"-construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he 
might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidenceu-and it noted that "[tjhat 
limitation, which continues to define the boundaries of the exception, ensures that the 
scope of a search incident to arrest is commensurate with its purposes . . . ." Id. at 
1716 (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763) (emphasis added). The Court then reminded us 
that "[ijf there is no possibility that an arrestee could reach into the area that the officers 
seek to search, both justifications for the search-incident-to-arrest exception are absent 
its order granting certiorari and remanded Mr. Gant's case to the Arizona Court of 
Appeals for reconsideration in light of a then-recent decision by the Arizona Supreme 
Court, Sfate v. Dean, 76 P.3d 429 (Ariz. 2003). Arizona v. Gant, 540 U.S. 963 (2003). 
Thus, the Supreme Court had to wait for Thornton to address the question of whether 
the authority to conduct a Belton search turns on whether the arrestee exited his vehicle 
of his own accord or the demand of the arresting officer. 
After Mr. Gant's case was remanded the Arizona Court of Appeals in late 2003, 
the Court of Appeals sent it back to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing. State v. 
Gant, 143 P.3d at 380, 381. Following the evidentiary hearing, the trial court once again 
declined to suppress the evidence in question, so Mr. Gant appealed for a second time. 
Id. This time, having the benefit of the various justices' opinions in Thornton, Mr. Gant 
argued that "because he and the other suspects were handcuffed and either locked in 
the police vehicles or otherwise secured," there was no risk of danger to the officers or 
the destruction of evidence and, therefore, his automobile could not searched incident 
and the rule does not apply." Id. Ultimately, with these standards in mind, the Gant 
Court rejected the "predominant" interpretation of Belfon, concluding that a broad 
reading of Belton, under which "a vehicle search would be authorized incident to every 
arrest of a recent occupant notwithstanding that in most case the vehicle's passenger 
compartment will not be within the arrestee's reach at the time of the search," was not 
supportable. Id. at 1719. The Court reasoned that such a broad reading of Belton 
would "untether the rule from the justifications underlying the Chimel exception-a result 
clearly incompatible with our statement in Belton that it 'in no way alters the 
fundamental principles established in the Chimel case regarding the basic scope of 
searches incident to lawful custodial arrests."' Id. Thus, the Court held "that the Chimel 
rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only 
when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger 
compartment at the time of the ~earch."~ Id. Moreover, the Court acknowledged that "it 
will be the rare case in which an officer is unable to fully effectuate an arrest so that a 
real possibility of access to the arrestee's vehicle remains." Id. at 1719 n.4. 
In light of the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Gant, it is now clear that, 
assuming the facts alleged in Mr. Hoskins' verified petition and affidavits are true, had a 
suppression motion been filed in his criminal case, it would have been, or at least 
should have been, granted. 
to his arrest. Id. at 382. This issue eventually made its way to the United States 
Supreme Court. 
The Court also concluded that, because of the uniqueness of vehicles, a search of a 
vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent occupant is also justified "when it is 'reasonable 
to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle," 
although the Court recognized that such a search is not based on the twin rationales of 
Chimel. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719. 
2. Idaho Precedent Notwithstandina. Com~etent Defense Counsel Would 
Have Filed A Suppression Motion On Mr. Hoskins' Behalf 
As noted above, in order to state a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
post-conviction petitioner must present sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue as to 
whether his defense attorney rendered deficient performance and, if so, as to whether 
that deficient performance prejudiced the petitioner in his criminal case. See Sfrickland, 
466 U.S. at 687-96. When the claim is that the petitioner's counsel was ineffective for 
failing to file a suppression motion, the reviewing court must consider whether that 
suppression motion would have had merit. As was ably explained by the ldaho Court of 
Appeals, "[ijf the motion lacked merit and would have been denied, counsel ordinarily 
would not be deficient for failing to pursue it, and, concomitantly, the petitioner could not 
have been prejudiced by the want of its pursuit." Huck v. Sfate, 124 ldaho 155, 158-59, 
857 P.2d 634, 637-38 (Ct. App. 1993). Thus, "[wlhere the alleged deficiency is 
counsel's failure to file a suppression motion, a conclusion that the motion, if pursued, 
would not have been granted, is generally determinative of both prongs of the 
[Sfricklandj test." Id. at 158, 857 P.2d at 637. Presumably, the converse of this is also 
true: a conclusion that the suppression motion would have been granfed is also 
generally determinative of both prongs of the Sfrickland test. 
Admittedly though, this is a somewhat atypical case in that the suppression 
motion which Mr. Hoskins contends his defense counsel should have filed would have 
requested relief that appeared to be unavailable under exisfing ldaho precedent. This is 
so because, as noted, the ldaho courts were among those that had previously 
construed Belfon very broadly. See, e.g, Nickel, 134 ldaho 610, 7 P.3d 219; 
Charpenfier, 13? ldaho 649, 962 P.2d 1033; Mclnfee, 124 ldaho 803, 864 P.2d 641. 
However, as should be obvious from the foregoing discussion of Gant, the Idaho courts 
have consistently misinterpreted Belton. Thus, a suppression motion, had it been filed, 
would not have requested relief that was unavailable under the Fourth Amendment; it 
would have simply requested the same relief that Mr. Gant ultimately received. 
Nor would a suppression motion, had it been filed, have requested a change in 
existing law; it would have simply requested faithful interpretation and application of the 
Fourth Amendment. Indeed, the Gant Court made it very clear that its holding was fully 
consistent with existing law, i.e., Belton and Chimel, and was not overruling Belton in 
any way. For example, it observed that the Arizona Supreme Court's narrow reading of 
the Belton rule (which it, of course, adopted in Gant) had "textual and evidentiary 
support," Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1718; it suggested early in its opinion that the broad 
interpretation of Belton that has predominated was a misinterpretation, likely driven by 
the characterization of the majority opinion provided by Justice Brennan in his dissent in 
Belton, id.; it shared Justice OJConnor's concern that "lower court decisions seem now 
to treat the ability to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent occupant as a 
police entitlement rather than as an exception justified by the twin rationales of Chimel," 
id. (quoting Thornton, 541 U.S. at 624 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part)), and it later 
pointed out that allowing a search based on such a police entitlement "is anathema to 
the Fourth Amendment," id. at 1721; it chastised police academies for their broad 
reading of Belton and lamented the fact that "[c]ountless individuals guilty of nothing 
more serious than a traffic violation have had their constitutional right to the security of 
their private effects violated as a result" of that broad reading," id, at 1722-23; it referred 
to the "generalization underpinning the broad reading" of Belton as "unfounded," id. at 
1723; and, most importantly, it specifically denied Justice Alito's charge that it was 
overruling Belton, explaining that it was simply giving Belton a "narrow reading," id. at 
1722 n.9. 
Finally, although Mr. Hoskins' defense counsel probably could not be held to 
have been ineffective for failing to file a suppression motion advancing a novel theory 
having no support in existing law, see Piro v. State, 146 Idaho 86, 91-93, 190 P.3d 905, 
910-12 (Ct. App. 2008), a suppression motion in Mr. Hoskins' case would have been far 
from novel and it most certainly did not lack support in existing law. At least as of the 
Supreme Court's issuance of its fractured opinion in Thornton, every criminal defense 
attorney was on notice that Belton's applicability to situations in which the arrestee no 
longer had access to his vehicle was still an open question under the Fourth 
Amendment. After all, Chief Justice Rehnquist, who wrote the lead opinion in Thornfon, 
specifically noted that the Court was declining to address the petitioner's argument that 
Belton's scope should be limited to "'recent occupant[s]' who are within 'reaching 
distance' of the car," and he conceded that "an arrestee's status as a 'recent occupant' 
may turn on his temporal or spatial relationship to the car at the time of the arrest and 
search . . . ." Thornton, 541 U.S. at 622 & n.2 (emphasis added). In addition, after 
Thornfon, defense attorneys were also on notice that a narrow reading of Belton, 
adhering to the twin rationales of Chimel, had at least some support from sitting 
Supreme Court justices. See Thornfon, 541 U.S. at 624-32 (Justice O'Connor's 
concurring opinion and Justice Scalia's concurring opinion, which was joined by Justice 
Ginsberg). Certainly Mr. Gant's defense attorneys recognized the value to crafting an 
argument around the concurring opinions in Thornton. (See note 5, supra (explaining 
that Mr. Gant originally made the same argument that was ultimately rejected in 
Thornton, but that he changed his argument following issuance of the Thornton 
opinion).) In addition, since Thornton, there have already been at least two instances 
here in ldaho where defendants have argued all the way through their appeals that the 
exception for searches incident to arrest could not be used to justify warrantless, 
suspicionless vehicle searches where the arrestees no longer had access to their 
vehicles. See, e.g., State v. Frederick, No. 33575, 2008 Unpublished Opinion No. 403 
(Ct. App. Mar. 20, 2008) (presently pending on review) (upholding a vehicle search, 
conducted incident to the arrest of the driver of that vehicle, even though the driver was 
already in handcuffs in a patrol car before the search was initiated); State v. Watts, 142 
ldaho 230, 127 P.3d 133 (2005) (declining to overrule Charpentier, supra, or State v. 
Holland, 135 ldaho 159, 15 P.3d I167 (2000), in the face of an argument that Thornfon 
calls for a narrower reading of Belton than the ldaho courts have traditionally given it). 
Moreover, although a broad reading of Belfon certainly predominated in the 28 years 
prior to Gant, see Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1718, the Gant Court itself recognized that courts 
have been at odds "regarding how close in time to the arrest and how proximate to the 
arrestee's vehicle an officer's first contact with the arrestee must be to bring the 
encounter within" Belton, Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1720 n.6. Indeed, prior to Gant, there was 
ample authority for a much narrower interpretation of Belton. At that time, at least 13 
states that had rejected a broad application of the Belton rule either under a narrow 
reading of Belton or under a state statutory or constitutional analysis. See Arizona v. 
Gant, 162 P.3d 640 (Ariz. 2007); State v. Hernandez, 410 So.2d 1381, 1385 (La. 1982); 
Commonwealth v. Toole, 448 N.E.2d 1264, 1266-1267 (Mass. 1983); Ferrell v. State, 
649 So.2d 831, 833 (Miss. 1995); Camacho v. State, 75 P.3d 370, 373-374 (Nev. 2003); 
State v. Pierce, 642 A.2d 947, 959 (N.J. 1994); Sfafe v. Arredondo, 944 P.2d 276, 284 
(N.M. 1997); People v. Torres, 543 N.E.2d 61, 6354 (N.Y. 1989); Stafe v. Fesler, 685 
P.2d 1014, 1016-1017 (Or. App. 1984); Commonwealth v. Whife, 669 A.2d 896, 902 
(Pa. 1995); Sfafe v. Bauder, 924 A.2d 38, 46 (Vt. 2007); Stafe v. Valdez, 152 P.3d 
1048, 1051 (Wash Ct. App. 2007); Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 489 (Wyo. 1999). 
Accordingly, the writing was on the wall after ~hornfon'; competent counsel would have 
challenged the search in Mr. Hoskins' case as having exceeded that which was 
permitted under the "search incident to arrest" exception to the warrant requirement. 
And, as noted above, Idaho precedent notwithstanding, that motion should have been 
successful. Accordingly, Mr. Hoskins' verified petition, coupled with the affidavits filed in 
support thereof, presented sufficient evidence to raise genuine issues of material fact as 
to whether his defense attorney's performance was deficient and whether that deficient 
performance prejudiced him and, therefore, the district court erred in summarily 
dismissing Mr. Hoskins' petition, 
The search in Mr. Hoskins' case took place on March 6, 2007 (R., p.34), almost three 
full years after Thornton was decided. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Hoskins respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate the district court order summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief, 
and that it remand his case for an evidentiary hearing on his claim that his defense 
attorney was ineffective for failing to file a suppression motion on his behalf. 
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